The GLASS project: supporting secure shibboleth-based single sign-on to campus resources by Watt, J. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watt, J. and Sinnott, R.O. and Jiang, J. (2007) The GLASS project: 
supporting secure shibboleth-based single sign-on to campus resources. 
In: Cox, S.J. (ed.) Proceedings of the UK e-Science All Hands Meeting 
2007, Nottingham, UK, 10th-13th September 2007. National e-Science 
Centre, Edinburgh. ISBN 9780955398834 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/7361/ 
 
Deposited on: 7 September 2009 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
The GLASS Project: Supporting Secure  
Shibboleth-based Single Sign-On to Campus Resources 
J. Watt, R.O. Sinnott, J. Jiang 
National e-Science Centre, University of Glasgow 
j.watt@nesc.gla.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Higher and Further education institutions in the UK are in the process of migrating their IT 
infrastructures to exploit Shibboleth technologies for federated access management. Ease of use and 
secure access are paramount to the successful uptake of these technologies, both from the end user and 
system administrator perspective. The JISC-funded GLASS project is a one-year project investigating 
the use of Shibboleth to support single sign-on to a variety of campus resources at the University of 
Glasgow including browser-based email access; the Moodle online virtual learning environment; the 
WebSURF online student records facility, and a network filestore browser. This paper describes the 
implementation issues and experiences gained in rolling out the Shibboleth technologies to support 
federated access management . 
 
 
1.   Introduction  
The academic community in the UK is in the first 
stages of deploying a nationwide federated access 
management infrastructure to support local 
authentication mechanisms. Part of the motivation 
for this is driven by the desire to simplify 
collaboration between institutions, and also to make 
the end user experience easier for non-technical end 
users (both staff and students). In general, if two 
institutions wish to collaborate, any computing 
resources needed at either location will be managed 
by their own systems administrators. Typically, this 
results in students or staff being allocated remote 
accounts on all non-local resources. As the number 
of collaborating institutions increases, so does the 
number of separate accounts the user will hold. The 
result of this is a clutch of different usernames and 
passwords which inevitably will be misplaced or 
confused. Further, if a local member of an institution 
has their privileges or contract revoked, there is no 
immediate way for any collaborating remote 
institutions to know if this user is still valid.  
 
The Shibboleth [1] federated access management 
system aims to rectify this issue by providing an 
infrastructure where the job of authenticating and 
providing information about a user is the sole 
responsibility of the user’s home institution, and this 
single authentication step will be recognised across 
all resources within the Shibboleth federation. 
Individual resources will still be able to exercise full 
control over access to their systems, normally by the 
presentation of specific roles by Shibboleth, but the 
step of confirming a user’s identity will have already 
been established by the home institution. In addition, 
Shibboleth supports the notion of single sign-on, 
whereby users will only have to enter their home 
username and password once each session to access 
and use multiple different resources in the 
federation. 
 
The Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) is 
steering the academic community in the United 
Kingdom towards federated access management 
over the next few years. The MATU (Middleware 
Assisted Take-Up) [2] service will be coordinating 
the changeover from the prevalent   Athens-style 
authentication [3] to Shibboleth based on the SDSS 
Federation [4]  (of which Glasgow is a member – 
currently operating two Identity Providers and four 
Service Providers). 
 
The one-year JISC-funded GLASS (GLASgow early 
adoption of Shibboleth) [5] project aims to 
investigate how the centralised directory structure 
which is being rolled out at the University of 
Glasgow for unified account management can be 
utilised in a Shibboleth environment. The university 
has adopted the Novell NSure account management 
system [6], which provides the infrastructure 
necessary to support easy creation/deletion of 
accounts, unique IDs, a secure audit trail and the 
propagation of this information to any related user 
databases in real time. The project has investigated 
how Shibboleth can utilise the NSure directory 
information to allow one-stop authentication from 
the primary staff/student information directory, and 
also how any access control attributes required may 
be integrated into this system.  
 
It should be noted that none of the applications 
within this paper rely on any non-identity based user 
attributes (such as role or an eduPerson [7] type 
attribute) for access control, so no changes to the 
NSure directory or schema are required. However, 
this kind of functionality is required to enable fine-
grained access control to protected resources. We 
will detail how we have tackled this problem 
through the use of multiple attribute authorities. 
  
The University has defined 4 initial key services 
which would benefit from single sign-on: 
• ‘Moodle’ online virtual learning 
environment 
• ‘WebSURF’ online personal record update 
facility 
• ‘WebMail’ browser based student email 
• A Network filestore browser 
 
The implementation for the final item, the network 
filestore, is incomplete at the time of writing, so this 
paper will focus on the issues encountered in 
Shibboleth-enabling the Moodle and WebSURF 
services which already exist, and also an open-
source version of Novell Webmail called Hula [8] 
 
2. Shibboleth 
 
Shibboleth is an Internet2 Middleware initiative to 
establish a federated authentication mechanism 
based on SAML [9]. The SAML profile calls for the 
creation of several trusted entities who are 
responsible for exchanging information about users, 
and these entities communicated through encrypted 
channels, thus preserving information privacy. An 
Identity Provider (IdP), sometimes referred to as an 
‘Origin’ is a body which releases digital credentials 
about its users. These credentials are typically 
released as multi-valued attributes, containing any 
information about the user which could be used to 
make an access control decision. The attributes may 
consist of direct, ‘real-world’ attributes such as 
Surname, Postal Address, Telephone number, or 
more abstract credentials like role, privilege or 
licences. There is no generic authentication method 
required for use with Shibboleth rather it is intended 
to support your local authentication system. Hence, 
systems like CAS [10] and Pubcookie [11] are 
popular, whereas in our infrastructure, we make use 
of the mod_auth_ldap [12] plug-in for Apache [13] 
which allows the login to use an LDAP directory. 
The IdP is responsible for defining the subset of user 
attributes which will be released to the federation of 
trusted sites (called an Attribute Release Policy or 
ARP), but has no policy on what should be done 
with them. A Service Provider (SP) is therefore 
defined, who acts as the resource or service which is 
to be Shibboleth protected. The Service Provider 
receives attributes from the IdP according to its own 
Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) and exposes 
them internally to applications running on the SP as 
HTTP headers. Any application may use the 
information encoded in these headers to make its 
access control decisions. A further (optional) entity 
is defined, called a Where Are You From (WAYF) 
service, which is provided by the UK SDSS 
federation. A WAYF normally takes the form of an 
intermediate web page listing all of the subscribed 
institutions which the user selects their home 
institution from. 
  
A normal invocation of a Shibboleth-protected 
resource proceeds as follows. The user types the 
URL of the desired resource into their browser, at 
this point the SP will detect that the user is 
requesting a Shibboleth-protected resource and will 
forward the user to the WAYF service. The user 
selects their home institution from the drop-down 
list, and then the user is forwarded to their IdP for 
authentication utilising their local 
username/password.  
 
Our implementation of Shibboleth uses the 
mod_auth_ldap Apache module to communicate 
with the central campus LDAP server for 
authentication and attribute retrieval. This module 
by default does the query and reception in non-
encrypted cleartext which exposes the link between 
the Identity Provider and the campus LDAP as 
exploitable by packet sniffing software. There are 
two solutions being considered, one involves setting 
up a secure SSL connection between these two 
nodes which has proven to be problematic due to the 
lack of a clear defined standard for SSL to LDAP, 
but also NSure has stricter requirements on how 
external connections may and may not be made to its 
directories. The second solution involves migration 
of the Identity Provider to sit behind the same 
network switch as the campus LDAP. Then the fact 
that the IdP-LDAP connection is unencrypted is no 
longer an issue as this part of the network would be 
invisible to the outside world. Obviously the first 
option offers greater flexibility so efforts are 
ongoing in this area to supply a location-independent 
Identity Provider.  
 
3. Moodle 
 
Moodle is an open-source course management 
system which allows educators and teachers to 
create online virtual learning environments [14]. 
Moodle now has over 100,000 registered users in 
over 150 countries and is being adopted by 
educational institutions worldwide. As is the case in 
Glasgow, most institutions end up deploying 
multiple Moodles on a departmental basis, each 
controlling the content of their individual sites. In 
the current regime, a student who is logged into 
Moodle in one department will have to log in again 
if they change to a different Moodle site, the irony 
being that the separate Moodles will probably be 
extracting their authentication details from the very 
same central directory. Moodle also transmits and 
receives its login information in cleartext, which 
carries heavy security implications if the resource is 
being accessed from outside the campus.  
 
 
Figure 1: The University of Glasgow central 
campus Moodle 
Moodle ships with login modules supporting various 
types of authentication mechanism, and a Shibboleth 
module is supplied with the standard build. The 
module is configured within the Moodle system 
admin page, where a configuration page allows 
various fields that Moodle can use (Surname, UID, 
email address etc.) to be mapped to HTTP headers 
that Shibboleth uses to expose its attributes. In 
Glasgow, the central Moodle uses five standard 
LDAP attributes to create a user session: uid (or cn); 
givenName; first name; surname and email address. 
The Moodle session username is created from the 
uid attribute as this is unique across campus. The 
other information can be used by Moodle in its 
accounting/audit feature. 
  
The standard Shibboleth configuration contains a 
global Apache directive which states: 
 
allowOverride None 
 
This means that Apache will not consider parsing 
.htaccess files if the Shibboleth login fails. This is 
desirable for normal operation, but Moodle uses a 
.htaccess file to provide user attributes if a 
Shibboleth session already exists. Hence this macro 
must be set to ‘all’ to allow single sign-on to be 
achieved. Since this change need only be applied to 
the Moodle directory, this directive does not 
negatively impact upon any other Shibboleth 
protected services on that resource.  
 
There is a further complication in that if the user had 
logged into Shibboleth from a different page than 
Moodle, the first time they visit Moodle they are 
pointed to a page which allows them to choose 
between the normal generic login and a Shibboleth 
login. This problem is alleviated if the Moodle front 
page is set to a “Shibboleth only” authentication, but 
this may not be desirable in the production 
environment. It should be noted that after the initial 
login to the Moodle, the Shibboleth single sign-on 
functions correctly. We are investigating ways in 
which an initial login to Moodle can detect whether 
or not a Shibboleth session is active and create the 
appropriate user session. 
 
 
4. Email 
 
The NSure account system offers an email service 
(NetMail) [15] viewable via a web browser 
interface. The NetMail service is deployed in its own 
web container, which would make Shibboleth 
enabling this application almost impossible without 
specific code changes from Novell. However, an 
open-source UNIX version of the NetMail service 
called Hula is available which aims to provide a 
version of NetMail configurable for non-Windows 
platforms, and more importantly can be run inside a 
separate web server application like Apache. Hula is 
called from the mod_python Apache plug-in 
module, and provides the same functionality as the 
proprietary NSure system.  
There was no way to tie this work into the live 
WebMail system at present, so this effort remains 
documented to speed up any future implementation. 
 
5. WebSURF 
 
WebSURF [16] is a browser-based application 
which allows students and staff to view and update 
central student records at any time and from any 
internet-enabled location. Students can use 
WebSURF to register for courses, check and 
maintain personal information and view their 
examination results. University staff can also use the 
system to view student records or update faculty 
information. The WebSURF software was written by 
the Management Information Services group at the 
University of Glasgow. 
 
In the current live implementation, WebSURF is a 
J2EE application which runs in a JBoss container 
utilising JAAS for login security. For students, an 
LDAP login module is used for communication with 
the central campus LDAP server. For staff, a remote 
EJB bean queries various staff authentication 
mechanisms which require pre-registration.  
 
For interfacing with Shibboleth, the generic JAAS 
module in JBoss was replaced with the SPIE JAAS 
module from the University of Oxford [17]. The 
SPIE JAAS Shibboleth module allows JBoss to pass 
security context information received from 
Shibboleth to the WebSURF application, or indeed 
any application running in JBoss. SPIE JAAS allows 
Shibboleth attributes to be accessed through 
standard JSP Servlet API calls. As such,  it is quite 
easy to integrate with other existing applications 
with little changes to code. Shibboleth authenticates 
the user (if not already done so) and receives their 
attributes, passing this information to the SPIE 
JAAS Login module through the mod_jk2 connector 
under the ‘Shib-Attributes’ HTTP header. The SPIE 
Login module is responsible for extracting the user 
ID (in our case, the ‘uid’ attribute) from the header, 
and passes the other extracted attributes to the SPIE 
JAAS Module. The SPIE JAAS Module creates a 
random key for the passed attribute set and passes 
the key back to the SPIE Login module for it to use 
as a temporary password for the session. Once 
formed, the password and username extracted from 
the attribute assertion are presented to the original 
application login page as if this information was 
input manually. The SPIE JAAS module can also 
perform rudimentary access control based on any 
attributes that have been defined to be used as a user 
role, although this is not strictly necessary for 
WebSURF. How the SPIE JAAS functionality has 
been integrated within the framework of our 
WebSURF system is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: The SPIE JAAS Login module 
operating in a Shibboleth-protected JBoss 
application server. The SAML exchange with the 
Shibboleth federation will only be done if a 
session doesn’t already exist. 
A test application was deployed to mimic the 
WebSURF deployment environment as closely as 
possible. Using information retrieved by Shibboleth 
from the central campus LDAP, our application was 
able to utilise the unique user ID attribute to form an 
application session within JBoss. The application 
was able to use already established security contexts 
from Shibboleth, thereby fulfilling the single sign-on 
requirement. Since WebSURF takes its login 
information from the generic JAAS module, the 
SPIE JAAS module will provide exactly the same 
information so no modification of the production 
WebSURF code will be necessary. 
 
However, the databases and resources utilised by the 
production version of WebSURF are too sensitive to 
allow deployment of the tool as it stands, and the 
tool is not designed for any more than one single 
deployment at the University of Glasgow. We 
negotiated a partial rewrite of the WebSURF 
functionality to demonstrate a test deployment 
which looks and operates like a normal WebSURF 
session, retaining an identical login implementation, 
but without compromising highly sensitive 
information sources.  
 
6. Storing Attributes 
 
By default, Shibboleth is configured with a single 
LDAP connector which it uses to retrieve user 
attributes. Since it is unlikely that a single attribute 
authority will be supplying all information about a 
user within an institution, there is provision in the 
Shibboleth configuration for the use of multiple data 
connectors so attributes from many sources may be 
located. A slightly different motivation for this may 
be found in the prevalent use of existing 
authentication mechanisms across campus – in our 
example, the Novell NSure system. With these 
established solutions comes a certain reluctance on 
the institution’s part to allow a new piece of 
software to start demanding that particular attributes 
or schemas may be appended or at worst, replaced. 
For example, in our current use case, the central 
campus LDAP directory was queried by the 
mod_auth_ldap Apache plug in to confirm the 
identity asserted by the username/password 
combination given by the user when prompted. 
However, since the central LDAP has not adopted 
the eduPerson schema, there would exist no 
placeholder for the user attributes within that 
directory (as our portal pages require the 
eduPersonEntitlement attribute to provide user roles 
in the organisation).  
 
However, using the principal identifier used to parse 
the central LDAP, we can search other LDAPs 
(AAs) for attributes pertaining to that user’s rights as 
long as the user entries contain this one piece of 
linking information (uid) to associate the user entries 
across multiple LDAPs, possibly with distinct 
Distinguished Names (DNs). The University of 
Glasgow has, as part of its unified account 
mechanism, guaranteed that the ‘uid’ attribute is 
unique for all users across campus, therefore this 
attribute may be confidently used to link user entries 
in separate LDAP servers to uniquely identify users. 
This provision allows departments within 
Universities to set up their own Attribute Authorities 
(LDAP servers for example) to issue roles to their 
employees, adopting completely separate LDAP 
namespaces if they so wish, but providing the ‘uid’ 
attribute is the same as the central campus LDAP, 
this AA may be parsed by Shibboleth for user 
attributes.  
 
There are several precautionary measures that need 
to be taken however when configuring the 
Shibboleth JNDI connectors (which make the 
connection to LDAP). By default, a connector will 
return an error if a user is not found in a directory. 
While this is a desirable feature for robustness, it has 
the effect that a user would need an entry in every 
LDAP directory that the IdP searches. An error in 
one directory causes a global error that returns no 
attributes, even if a valid set is located in another 
LDAP. The solution to this is to use a configuration 
parameter in the JNDI connector definition of 
 
propagateErrors=”false” noResultIsError=”false” 
 
This has the effect of ignoring errors occurring from 
a user’s lack of entries in certain directories. 
 
As an illustration (Figure 3), consider the situation 
where a clinical medicine researcher may wish to 
collaborate with a department hosting geographical 
databases in order to link patient illness to census 
data, for example. He already holds an attribute in 
his home department (Clin_projectY) but requires 
roles to access the geography resources. In this case, 
the researcher would request a particular role 
(Geo_project1) from the geographical department, 
who would create a new user within their own 
LDAP representing the researcher, remembering to 
issue the user the same unique ‘uid’ as the central 
LDAP, and allocate the appropriate role there. This 
allows the collaborating department to fully control 
the attributes pertaining to access of its own services, 
yet if this user is removed from the University, it 
will not be critical for the department to remove this 
user’s attribute as the user will fail the very first 
authentication step and the user’s attributes would 
never get requested.  
 
 
Figure 3: Distributed attributes from multiple 
campus Attribute Authorities, linked by a 
common institutionally unique 'uid'. 
 
In contrast to the above ‘distributed attributes’ 
model, we have investigated in previous projects the 
idea of Dynamic Delegation. Put simply, this allows 
departments to collaborate by issuing roles and the 
right to issue roles to its fellow collaborators 
directly, rather than retaining them locally. Using the 
previous clinical/geographic example, the researcher 
would request an attribute to allow them to access 
the geographical database, and the geography 
department would issue the role directly to the 
researcher’s LDAP server in clinical medicine. 
Therefore roles for many departments would be 
stored in a single placeholder representing the user’s 
home department. See Figure 4 for a schematic of 
this interaction.  
 
Since this model involves surrendering some control 
over your own attributes (as they are being stored 
externally) there must be a secure infrastructure to 
allow these roles to propagate in a controlled 
manner. The PERMIS Delegation Issuing Service 
(DIS) [18] is a web service which allows such a 
model to be implemented, but the attributes are 
stored in LDAP in the form of X.509 Attribute 
Certificates, which are digitally signed offering 
another layer of security. ACs are issued according 
to a local policy, so initially a collaborating 
department would know nothing of an external 
department’s attribute set. The external department 
therefore issues a Role Allocation Policy to the 
home department, allowing the external 
department’s role to be issued in the user’s home 
LDAP while obeying any restrictions that the 
external department wishes to enforce.  
 
 
Figure 4: Use of the Delegation Issuing Service to 
allocate external department's roles to the user's 
home department.  This allows a single Attribute 
Authority to contain all the information 
regarding a user's privileges across campus. 
 
The DyVOSE (Dynamic Virtual Organisations in e-
Science Education) [19] project investigated a use 
case involving PERMIS-protected access to 
databases located in two different locations, 
enforced by two separately authored policies. The 
two sites agreed to exchange Role Allocation 
Policies which allowed the remote institution to 
allocate roles required for access to its services to a 
user based at their home institution. The Attribute 
Certificates themselves are issued by the DIS Web 
Service on behalf of privileged users (systems 
administrators or directors). This means that these 
users do not require a signing key pair to issue ACs 
to their subordinates, the advantage gained being 
that subsequent revocation of any user’s key pair at 
any point in a signing chain will not invalidate any 
legally issued end-user certificates that this revoked 
user had handed out.  It should be noted that all 
certificate usage and interaction is done in the 
background, and no certificates need to be handled 
by the user. Also, because the roles are stored in the 
form of signed digital certificates, it means that the 
certificate needs to be decoded by openssl, for 
instance, in order to extract an attribute string. This 
model is appropriate for fine-grained access control, 
but is unlikely to be adopted by an institutional-level 
security system. It would be expected that individual 
departments/projects would make the decision to 
adopt this technology.  
 
7. Scoping Attributes 
 
One of the immediate issues with operating 
Shibboleth in a large scale federation such as the UK 
Access Management Federation [20] is that of 
implied trust. When a new Shibboleth Service 
Provider is implemented, the default behaviour is to 
accept the authentication assertions issued by any 
Identity Provider in the federation. Typically, coarse 
grained access control can be enforced using the 
attributes passed by Shibboleth, however there could 
arise a situation where two Service Providers require 
the same value of a generic attribute (such as 
eduPersonEntitlement) purely coincidentally. For 
example, Site A requires an eduPersonEntitlement 
attribute of ‘full_access’ to gain access to their 
biological data, whereas Site B requires the same 
attribute to access its particle physics data. Even if 
these sites are unaware of each other’s existence, if a 
user authenticates at Site A and then finds the URL 
of the Site B service, their authentication assertion 
will be trusted anyway, but their authorisation token 
will be correct to access a system they are not 
intended to access, purely because the same attribute 
value has been presented.  
 
A solution to this is to ‘scope’ the user attributes 
provided by Shibboleth. Using this concept, an 
Identity Provider may be configured to only release 
a certain attribute to a specific Service Provider (or 
set of Service Providers). In a similar way, Service 
Providers may be configured to only accept 
attributes from a particular Identity Provider, so the 
situation described above is avoided as Site A will 
not be able to assert Site B’s eduPersonEntitlement 
attribute. Related to location scope is attribute value 
scope. Using this allows not only the location of an 
attribute to be filtered, but also its value. This is 
useful as a user may have many attributes relating to 
several projects, some of which may not be desirable 
to release to just anyone. Using value scope, a 
Service Provider can only accept the subset of 
attributes that it is interested in and reject the rest. 
This rejection happens within the Shibboleth Apache 
module so the sensitive attributes can never get 
through to the service itself.   
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We have demonstrated that it is possible to integrate 
Shibboleth with a central institution authentication 
infrastructure without impacting on their operations. 
We successfully integrated Moodle, a bespoke 
student WebSURF application, and our own Grid 
resources with the University’s unified account 
management system. We have adopted an 
infrastructure which allows the campus LDAP to be 
the authoritative source of user authentication 
information, yet through the use of multiple attribute 
authorities, we have shown it would be possible for 
individual departments or groups within the 
University to issue attributes and roles to their users 
for access to their own systems or for access to 
resources provided by collaborators. This work is 
being used in several other projects at the National 
e-Science Centre at the University of Glasgow 
including the EPSRC pilot project “Meeting the 
Design Challenges of nanoCMOS Electronics” 
project [21]. This and other projects are providing 
real life use cases testing this security infrastructure, 
and we expect will demonstrate scalability not just at 
institutional level but across national level 
Shibboleth-based access management federations. 
 
9. Acknowledgements 
 
Many thanks to Dr. Christian Fernau of the 
University of Oxford for his help in configuring 
their SPIE JAAS module, and also to Lukas 
Haemmerle of SWITCH, Switzerland for his help 
with the Moodle Shibboleth authentication module. 
Thanks to Robert Stewart of the Management 
Information Service at the University of Glasgow  
for information and executables for the WebSURF 
application, and to Dave Anderson of IT Services for 
his help with accessing the central campus LDAP 
server at the University of Glasgow. Thanks are also 
due to Scott Cantor, Nate Klingenstein and Chad Le 
Joie for their help through the Shibboleth support 
mailing list. GLASS is funded from a grant from 
JISC whom we also acknowledge here. 
 
 
10. References 
 
[1] Internet2 Shibboleth Technology, 
http://shibboleth.internet2.edu  
[2] eduServe Middleware Assisted Take-Up Service 
(MATU) http://www.matu.ac.uk  
[3] eduServe Athens for Education, 
http://www.athens.ac.uk/  
[4] SDSS Federation http://www.sdss.ac.uk  
[5] JISC Funded Glasgow University Early 
Adoption of Shibboleth (GLASS) Project 
http://www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/glass  
[6] NSure, Novell Identity Manager 
http://www.novell.com/products/identitymanager/  
[7] eduPerson Specification 
http://www.educause.edu/eduperson  
[8] The Hula Project, Novell, http://www.hula-
project.org  
[9] Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
v2, March 2005 http://www.oasis-
open.org/specs/index.php  
[10] Community Authorisation Server 
http://www.lesc.ic.ac.uk/projects/cas.html  
[11] Pubcookie: Open-source software for intra-
institutional web authentication, 
http://www.pubcookie.org/  
[12] mod_authz_ldap: X509 Certificates and LDAP 
http://authzldap.othello.ch/  
[13] Apache Web Server,  http://www.apache.org/  
[14] Moodle – A Free Open Source Course 
Management System for Online Learning 
http://moodle.org  
[15] Novell NetMail 
http://www.novell.com/products/netmail  
[16] WebSURF Student Records Update Service, 
University of Glasgow (Robert Stewart, 
Management Information Services),  
http://www.websurf.gla.ac.uk  
[17] SPIE JAAS Module Architecture, SPIE Project, 
University of Oxford,  
http://spie.oucs.ox.ac.uk/Wiki.jsp?page=JAASmodul
eArch  
[18] D.W.Chadwick, A.Otenko, “The PERMIS 
X.509 Role Based Privilege Management 
Infrastructure, Future Generation Computer 
Systems, 936 (2002) 1-13 December 2002. Elsevier 
Science BV. 
[19] J.Watt, J.Koetsier, A.Stell, R.O.Sinnott, 
“DyVOSE Project: Experiences in Applying 
Privilege Management Infrastructures” in UK e-
Science All Hands Meeting Proceedings, 
Nottingham, September 2006 
[20] The UK Access Management Federation for 
Education and Research, 
http://www.ukfederation.org.uk  
[21] “Meeting the Design Challenges of nanoCMOS 
Electronics”  EPSRC Pilot Project 
http://www.nanocmos.ac.uk  
 
 
